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Abstract
This paper develops and analyzes a hierarchical model of judicial re-
view in multimember appellate courts. In our model, judicial panels ac-
quire information endogenously, through the e¤orts of individual panelists,
acting strategically. The resulting equilibria strongly resemble the empir-
ical phenomena collectively known as panel e¤ectsand in particular
the observed regularity with which ideological diversity on a panel pre-
dicts greater moderation in voting behavior (even after controlling for the
median voters preferences). In our model, non-pivotal panel members
with ideologies far from the median have the greatest incentive to acquire
additional policy-relevant information where no one on a unied panel
would be willing to do so. The resulting information structure pushes
deliberation and observed voting patterns towards apparent moderation.
We illustrate the plausibility of our model by calibrating it to empirical
data, and explore various normative implications of our theory.
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1 Introduction
Within the growing empirical literature on judicial review, three notable nd-
ings stand out. First, politics matters: Judges appointed by Democrats are
more likely to uphold liberal agency and/or trial court decisions and reverse
conservative ones than are their Republican-appointed counterparts.1 Second,
party matters: while manifesting qualitatively similar behavior, Democrat and
Republican judges do not mirror one another exactly (e.g., they do not always
cross the party line with the same frequency). Third, diversity matters:
mixed three-judge panels (i.e., two Democrats and one Republican or two Re-
publicans and one Democrat) tend to make decisions that are more moderate
than do homogenous panels dominated by a single party (Democrat or Repub-
lican).2
This paper focuses on the third feature the evident moderating e¤ects of
panel diversity and in the process says something about the other two. Our
contribution is primarily theoretical: we develop and analyze a model connecting
(a) hierarchical auditing of lower-tier actors (e.g., administrative agencies or
trial courts); (b) group deliberation within a multimember auditing entity (e.g.,
an appellate judicial panel); and (c) strategic decisions by group members to
make costly investments in information acquisition relevant to deliberation (e.g.,
about the case itself, underlying policy choices at play, doctrinal constraints,
etc.). Our model predicts each of the empirical regularities noted above as
an equilibrium phenomenon, and in particular the evident moderating e¤ect of
panel diversity. Specically, we show that ideologically heterogeneous panels are
more likely to incentivize broad information production than are homogenous
ones. For example, a lone Republican (or Democrat) on a three-judge panel
may be willing to uncover new information for her counterparts even if they
are not willing to provide it for themselves. The information ow induced by
panel diversity generates voting patterns that appear more moderate than those
of homogeneous panels. To the extent that our hypothesis is correct, it holds
implications for whether mixed judicial panels should be encouraged and/or
required. (Miles and Sunstein 2008, Tiller and Cross 1999; cf. Schanzenbach
and Tiller 2008, 2009).3
1See Revesz (1997), Cross and Tiller (1998), and Miles and Sunstein (2006, 2008), Sunstein
et al (2004), as well as earlier work in political science (such as Songer 1982), for empirical
conrmation. The explanation for this phenomenon is widely thought to be ideological dis-
position. Segal and Spaeth 2002. Accord Stephenson (2009) at 46.
2See also Peresie (2005), nding similar e¤ects for male and female judges. For an excellent
overview, Hettinger et al. (2007). For the history of this phenomenon, see Maveety (2005) and
Kastellec (2008). Kastellec produces data suggesting that panel e¤ects are a comparatively
recent phenomenon, arising in the second half of the 20th Century. By 2011, however, there
is no doubt that robust panel e¤ects exist.
3As Stephenson (2009: pg. 47) points out, there are two e¤ects from mixed judicial panels.
One is the tendency of the minority judge to vote with the majority. The second, and in our
opinion likely the more important e¤ect, is the tendency of the majority judges to creep ever
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The framework we develop builds on our prior work (Spitzer and Talley
2000),4 but departs from it in a few crucial ways. First, we generalize the model
to yield a deeper understanding of appellate court dynamics (and hierarchical
auditing more broadly). Rather than treating the appellate court as a unitary
actor (as both we and Cameron et al. (2000) did), we explicitly model it as
a multimember body. This generalization is critical, since strategic interaction
among panelists generates the core intuitions we highlight here. Second, we
tailor our framework to include key institutional attributes in administrative
law. When agency / trial court decisions are appealed, the court must hear
such appeals. Yet, appellate judges can choose how intensively to scrutinize
the matter before them. Our model specically captures this endogenous e¤ort
choice by individual judges sitting on a larger panel. Finally, our framework can
be simulated and tested with real-world data, and accordingly we demonstrate
that a calibrated version of our model predicts patterns of panel e¤ects that are
observed in the existing literature.
Political scientists have suggested a number of theories for explaining the
moderating e¤ect of ideological diversity on three judge panels. A rst set of
explanations hinges on social cohesion and collegiality (e.g., Songer 1982: 226),
positing that social pressures may lead non-pivotal minority judges to go along
with the majority, as a mechanism for enhancing (or preserving) inter-panelist
harmony. Even if such tastes for collegiality are relatively weak, they may
be enough to deter the minority panelist from taking the time and energy to
author a dissent.5 Dissent aversion a set of predictions about when judges
will allocate their time to writing dissents partially relies on a theory of social
cohesion and collegiality. Epstein et al. (2011), for example, show that dissent
incidence is negatively associated with caseload and positively associated with
both circuit size and intra-circuit ideological diversity, all of which may bear on
the costs, benets and sustainability of collegial norms among appellate court
judges. In a related vein, some have posited that additional pressures from
group polarization may play a more extreme role in homogenous panels, which
can in turn lead to apparent moderation of mixed panels (e.g., Sunstein et al.,
2004: 308). That is, individuals may become more extreme when interacting
with like minded counterparts (Myers 1975; Asch 1951). Applied to judges,
polarization e¤ects predict that homogenous panels reinforce each others prior
so subtly in the direction of the minority. As it happens, in our model, described below, both
e¤ects can occur simultaneously.
4We are also implicitly building on Cameron et al. (2000), which was published contem-
poraneously with Spitzer and Talley (2000), and uses a model very similar in spirit.
5Within this literature, both social and workload-related costs/benets can play a role.
Atkins (1973) (social pressure); Atkins & Green (1976) (empirical support for workload
and dissents inversely related); Goldman (1968) (norm of consensus); Green (1986) (workload
reduces dissents). See also Posner (2002: 32) ([m]ost judges do not like to dissent....Not
only is it a bother and frays collegiality, and usually has no e¤ect on the law, but it also tends
to magnify the signicance of the majority opinion.); Landes and Posner (2009) (discussing
dissent aversion). Relatedly, Fischman (2009) studies an attitudinal model, augmented by a
cost to writing a dissent. The greater that cost, the more likely it is that a minority judge will
join the majority opinion. His model does not predict that the majority judges will moderate
their position and join the minority.
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commitments, thereby leading to more ideologically extreme decision making
(and apparently more moderation in mixed panels).
A second explanation, whistleblowing, is perhaps the leading explanation
among positive political theory (PPT) scholars to explain panel e¤ects. First
proposed by Cross and Tiller (1998), this account conjectures that a minority
party panelist can e¤ectively threaten to tattle on the majority (e.g., through a
dissent) if those majority actors ignore or misconstrue established precedent or
doctrine. If the minority member can credibly threaten can expose a majoritys
omissions or misstatements, she can deter such behavior in the rst instance,
producing more moderation. (Cross and Tiller 1998: 2156). The whistleblower
account harbors a distinct role for formal legal doctrine as a constraint on ju-
dicial review. That is, the whistleblower account gets its traction from the
existence of an independent, commonly subscribed legal canon, whose violation
can be detected and communicated to a higher authority. Our approach, in
contrast, neither requires nor precludes the possibility that legal doctrine might
also do some work and, in fact, allows for doctrine to be vague, contested, over-
or under-determined, or simply unintelligible. In order to highlight the role of
endogenous information production, we will focus only on ideology, information,
choice, and outcomes.6
A nal explanation, perhaps the leading one among legal academics, was
proposed by Revesz (1997: 1732), and is sometimes identied as the delibera-
tion hypothesis. In essence, by being empaneled with judges from the opposite
political party and deliberating with them, one is naturally led to moderate
her positions. The informational explanation that we propose here is perhaps
closest in spirit to Reveszsuggestion, but we develop it within a more formal
theoretical framework, generating in turn more precise predictions about the
mechanics of panel e¤ects.
Before proceeding, one caveat deserves specic mention. Although our
analysis aims to understand and explain judicial panel e¤ects, it has obvious
ties to other literatures in political science, psychology, economics and elsewhere
on group deliberation. These include papers on (so called) persuasion games,7
6We hasten to add that the role of doctrine may certainly be important (and we have
published on the role and characterization of doctrine before (Cohen & Spitzer (1994); Talley
(1999)). Indeed, the process of information acquisition we model here could, in pricinple,
also extend to conventional legal research on existing precedent, so that whistleblowing would
represent a special case within our framework. We take up this interpretation below.
More generally, the strategic formulation of doctrine by the Supreme Court, and its e¤ects
on lower courts, takes up a signicant fraction of research in this eld. See Cross & Tiller
(2006), Jacobi (2009), Jacobi and Tiller (2007), Lax (2007, 2008), Lax and Landa (2009),
McNollGast (1995), Strauss (1987), Tiller (1998), Shavell (2009), and Stephenson (2006).
Rodriguez and Weingast (2007) have extended this approach to the interaction between the
courts and Congress. Kastellec (2007) extends Cross and Tillers whistleblower model into
Kornhausers (1992a, b) case space and explores how three-judge panels (as opposed to
individual judges) enhance the Supreme Courts ability to see its preferred doctrine carried
out. Kastellec (2010) extends the model to a two-level hierarchy above three judge panels,
and nds the asymmetric form of control induced by whistleblowing that Cross and Tiller
(1998) predicted.
7Milgrom and Roberts (1986).
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inquisitorial versus advocacy systems,8 political lobbying,9 media reporting and
bias,10 and the value of ideological diversity more generally within deliberative
fora.11 We do not attempt to develop these links fully here, though our general
approach may both inform such inquiries and is, in many respects, informed by
them.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes at greater length the
literature relating to panel e¤ects, along with the prevailing theories that have
been posited to explain them. Section 3 presents our theoretical model and
characterizes its equilibria. Section 4 uses simulation methods to calibrate
our model to existing empirical data, and develops some preliminary thoughts
about testing our model against alternatives. Section 5 discusses extensions of
our model. Section 6 considers implications, and Section 7 concludes.12
2 Empirical Panel E¤ects
Before beginning with our analytic enterprise, it is perhaps useful to situate our
claims within the empirical literature. As noted in the introduction, during
the last decade the empirical literature on judicial panel e¤ects has proliferated
rapidly. Although we cannot review this eld in its entirety, a few of the cen-
tral landmarks in this literature are worth recounting. Revesz (1997) is often
credited with being the rst legal academic to notice and document the phe-
nomenon. He collected challenges to decisions of the Environmental Protection
Agency that were brought in the DC Circuit between 1970 and 1994. Revesz
divided the time into periods in which the membership of the DC Circuit was
unchanged and utilized the random assignment of judges to test hypotheses
about the e¤ect of panel composition on votes and outcomes.13 Reveszs results
provided early empirical support for panel e¤ects, though they are mixed as
to which pattern of e¤ects is supported by the data. In the 1970s, the link
between panel diversity and moderation was manifest in Republican-appointed
judges, but not Democrats. In later periods, however, both Republicans and
Democrats appeared to display such patterns.
Shortly after Reveszs study, Cross and Tiller (1998) analyzed 170 cases in
which the DC Circuit reviewed agency interpretations of regulatory statutes.
They found that unied panels (consisting of all Republicans or all Democrats)
were 17% less likely to defer to agencies than were split panels. More perti-
nent to the panel e¤ects literature, they also found that unied panels deferred
to agencies only 33% of the time when the panels and agencys politics were
inconsistent, but deferred to the agency 62% of the time when the panel was
8Dewatripoint and Tirole (1999).
9De Figueiredo and Cameron (2008).
10Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006).
11Farhang and Wawro (2004); Peresie (2005).
12The Appendix includes a number of technical derivations and proofs that are suppressed
in the text.
13Revesz also tested hypotheses unconnected to panel composition, and found voting pat-
terns that are consistent with an ideological component to judicial voting.
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politically heterogeneous (Cross and Tiller, 1998: 2172). This nding is also
consistent with the moderating e¤ect of split panels.
Miles and Sunstein (2006, 2008) also present evidence supporting panel ef-
fects.14 They collected all Circuit Court reviews of EPA and NLRB decisions
between 1996 and 2006 for insu¢ cient factual basis or for being arbitrary or
capricious, which together they call arbitrarinessreview. Next, they compute
the validation rate, which is the rate at which appellate panels upheld admin-
istrative decisions against challenge. Then they coded for the politics of the
administrative action by considering who challenged Agency action; if indus-
try challenged the Agency action then the Agency action was deemed liberal,
whereas if a union or an environmental group challenged an Agency action, then
the Agency action was deemed conservative. Last, Miles and Sunstein coded
each judges political party as equal to the party of the appointing president for
that judge.
Miles and Sunstein found the same basic ideological component of voting
that others have found. Judges appointed by Democrats were more likely to
validate liberal administrative Agency actions than conservative actions. Judges
appointed by Republicans had the reverse tendency. But in addition, Republi-
can appointees were more likely to validate conservative administrative agency
actions when they were sitting with two other Republican Judges than when
they were sitting with one or more Democrats. Democrat appointees appeared
to behave in similar (but perhaps more complicated) ways.15
Unfortunately, Miles and Sunstein constructed their measures by pooling
all mixed panels, rather than separating, for example, RRD and DDR panels.
On the basis of their articles, then, one cannot directly observe the change in
voting tendencies between a sole minority member of a panel and the same judge
who enjoys a two-judge majority. Nevertheless, Miles and Sunstein measure the
empirical propensity of a Democrat judge to uphold agency decisions when she
is moved from a unied Democrat panel to a mixed panel. They nd Democrat
appointees are less likely to validate liberal agency decisions and more likely to
uphold conservative decisions when deliberating in mixed panels. Republican
propensities move in the opposite qualitative direction (although Republican
voting patterns were somewhat less sensitive to panel composition than were
Democrats). We regard these results as evidence in favor of panel e¤ects; that
is, inclusion on a mixed panel tends to moderate voting patterns.16
14Because we later utilize the Miles & Sunstein data to calibrate our model, we spend some
time here describing their papers in detail.
15Similarly, Sunstein et al. (2004) investigated federal appeals panels in thirteen categories.
They found that the typical pattern of panel e¤ects existed in most of the subject areas (e.g.
campaign nance, a¢ rmative action, EPA regulation); however, in at least one context (Title
VII discrimination cases) it was muted, and in three areas (federalism, criminal law, takings
clause) the pattern was missing entirely. In some of the areas the e¤ects were symmetric,
while in other areas not. In two areas (abortion and capital punishment) they found pure
ideological voting, but no panel e¤ects at all.
16 It is less clear whether the Miles and Sunsteins results should be taken as evidence of
symmetry or asymmetry between Republicans and Democrats (and could be consistent with
either). Cf. Schanzenbach and Tiller (2008).
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Landes and Posner (2009) correct and clean the most commonly used data
bases, and then present a large number of empirical analyses on judicial review.
They claim that they could not code lower Federal Court votes as majority or
dissent, and hence they could not say much about panel e¤ects per se. They
did nd, however, that judges appointed by Democrats were more likely to cast
liberal votes than were judges appointed by Republicans, and also that mixed
panels appeared to manifest moderationin their views, at least among Federal
Circuit panels (but not on the Supreme Court).
In a signicant recent paper that both reviews and contributes to the lit-
erature on gender e¤ects in judging, Boyd et al. (2011) tested whether male
and female judges vote di¤erently in thirteen di¤erent doctrinal areas. They
found signicant panel e¤ects in only one area: sex discrimination in employ-
ment, where males were far more likely to vote liberally when sitting with a
female judge than when sitting with only other males. Boyd et al. interpret
this result as reecting an informational explanation of panel e¤ects. Women
have information about how employment discrimination works, which they can
share with their panelists. Their interpretation meshes very nicely with the
mechanism driving our model.17
Some recent academic contributions have injected some skepticism (or at
least words of caution) into the enterprise of empirical estimation of judicial
preferences. Edwards and Livermore (2009: 1916), for example, strongly criti-
cize this literature, partly on the ground that it is based on an attitudinal model
that does not take into account the dynamics of group deliberation. Our model
is the rst that we know of to attempt to characterize an important character-
istic of deliberation information exchange. For reasons that are not clear (at
least to us), several commentators seem to regard collegial deliberation as in-
consistent with ideological explanations. (Edwards and Livermore (2009: 1917);
Tacha (1995: 586); Wald (1999: 255)). As our model shows, however, the two
concepts not only can coexist, but their interaction may be key to understanding
panel e¤ects.
In sum, the empirical literature provides overwhelming support for the propo-
sition that ideological di¤erences among judges matter for outcomes. It also
provides signicant evidence for a moderation e¤ect in heterogeneous panels,
where minority and majority factions tend to move towards one another when
voting. Finally, there is some intermittent evidence that even as they exhibit
qualitatively similar patterns, Republican and Democrat judges do not always
behave as complete mirror images of each other. That said, the precise drivers
of these phenomena are still not well understood. Accordingly, the next sec-
tions of this paper develop a theoretical framework that can both predict and
explain the observed phenomena.
17Kastellec (2011, working paper) nds similar results for African American Judges on the
Courts of Appeal for a¢ rmative action cases.
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3 Model
In this section, we introduce and analyze a formal model of deliberation within
multijudge panels. Using this model, we show how ideological diversity can en-
dogenously a¤ect information production, which in turn generates panel e¤ects
even when judicial preferences remain constant. To expose our key intuitions,
we begin with a relatively simple structure, addressing more complicated exten-
sions in later sections.
3.1 Framework
Consider a two-level hierarchy, consisting of a unitary initial actor, A, repre-
senting an administrative agency or a trial court, and a multi-member body, J;
which represents an appellate judicial panel. We suppose the actors must make
a regulatory / policy decision y from a policy space Y = f 1; 1g : Intuitively, Y
may embody a choice between a politically Conservativepolicy (y = 1) and
a Liberalone (y =  1). For example, actors in the hierarchy may be consid-
ering whether to preserve a deregulatory status quo ante (such as not requiring
passive safety restraints in passenger cars) or to adopt a regulatory intervention
(requiring them).18
Although actors are assumed to have a priori policy preferences (see below),
we also suppose that they care about the t between the ultimate policy choice
and an objective state of the world what we will call facts. In the example
above, facts might embody information about how e¤ective passive restraints are
relative to their costs. We presume that a random variable X 2 R represents
the true facts, and that X is commonly known ex ante to be normally distrib-
uted with mean  and precision  :19 (Our framework also admits the limiting
degenerate case when  ! 0; so that priors are essentially uninformative).
3.1.1 Judicial and Agency Actions and Preferences
The true realization of facts, x; is important to all decision makers because it
a¤ects their ultimate policy preferences. In particular, we assume that each
regulatory / judicial actor i faces quadratic payo¤s over policy outcomes of the
form   (x+ i   y)2 ; where x and y are as described above, and i 2 R denotes
actor is political predispositions or ideology which we assume to be drawn
independently from common distribution H (). We place little structure (at
this stage) on the nature of this distribution, though a common assumption in
the literature is that it consists of two mass points, corresponding to Democrats
(i = D) and Republicans ( = R > D) : In any event, our structure implies
that each actor possesses an ideal point in policy space, yi = x+i; with utility
18Our framework easily extends to allow for more than two outcomes. We address this
extension in Section 5.
19Because normal distributions make our analysis more tractable, we utilize them throught
the analysis below. As will become clear, however, our general arguments do not turn crucially
on this distributional form.
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falling in the squared distance from that point. Note that while actorspolitical
inclinations (i) remain xed, the locations of their ideal points also depend
on realized facts (x). Our framework therefore allows for actors who may
lean left or right on a priori grounds, but need not be dogmatic ideologues.20
In principle, facts could be strong enough to overcome ideology, inducing a
(say) liberal judge/agency to favor a conservative policy (or vice versa). Such
persuadability at least for the median voter seems central to the deliberative
process.
Figure 1: Ideal point as a function of facts (x) & ideology ()
Figure 1 illustrates the ideal point mapping for the specic case where x = 12 ;
comparing the ideal point of two decision makers: a Democrat (with i = D 
 1); and a Republican (with i = R  1). In the gure, when the Republican
judge (who leans toward conservative policies) observes a relatively conservative
set of facts
 
x = 12

, her ideal point is relatively conservative, at yR = 1:5: If
constrained to choose policy y 2 f 1; 1g ; then, she will clearly prefer y = 1:
The Democrat, in contrast, leans liberal; observing the same facts pushes her
mildly right, but only enough to move her ideal point to yD =  0:5: Thus, the
Democrat judge would continue to favor y =  1; but with more ambivalence
about her position than her Republican counterpart. Were x to take on a
20Our model treats ideology as a primitive. We therefore do not address what might generate
heterogeneous ideologies to begin with; nor do we consider whether information aggregation
can cause ideologies to converge. See, e.g., Aumann (1976).
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more extreme realization (x > 1), it would be enough to sway the Democrat to
support the conservative outcome. (And symmetrically with the Republican
for x <  1).
Our model injects a signicant complication into the story illustrated by
Figure 1. Specically, decision makers in this model never know with cer-
tainty what the truefacts are. Rather, they must attempt to maximize their
expected utility from a chosen policy, given the information that is available
(described in greater detail below).
The judicial review process in our game consists of two stages. In the
rst stage, the lower level actor (Player A) possessing ideology A makes a
decision about legal/regulatory policy. In reaching its decision, A is privy to a
signal Z 2 R; which conveys noisy information about x. We assume assume Z
is normally distributed with unbiased mean x and nite precision : (We also
assume that this signal is either collected at no incremental cost, or its collection
is non-discretionary to A). After observing the signal, Player A announces a
regulatory rule, y =  1 or y = 1:
Upon Player As announced decision, the second stage begins, where with
probability  2 (0; 1) an appeals court is asked to review As initial ruling.21
The appellate court, denoted collectively by J , is composed of an odd number
of (2M   1) judges, where M 2 f1; 2; 3; :::g.22 Its panelists are chosen at ran-
dom from the judiciary pool once an appeal occurs. Let   f1; :::; 2M 1g
denote the set of judicial ideologies on the panel: Without loss of general-
ity, one can re-index the panelists in terms of their ideological order statis-
tics,

(1); :::; (2M 1)
	
; so that (1) corresponds to the ideology of the most
liberal judge on the panel, and (2M 1) corresponds to the ideology of the
most conservative judge. We will be particularly interested in the 3-tuple
^  (1); (M); (2M 1)	 ; which includes the most liberal, the most conserv-
ative, and median ideologies of the panel (its Left, Right, and Center as it
were).
Should the appellate panel hear the case, it costlessly observes the realiza-
tion of Z the factual signal / record upon which the agency relied. In addition,
however, each panelist may individually invest in an auditing technology that
generates an additional signal V about the facts. We assume V to be inde-
pendent of Z; and normally distributed with unbiased mean x and precision
: Collecting this signal imposes a cost c > 0 on the auditing judge (which
reects e¤ort, docket pressures, opportunity costs, and so forth).23 For the mo-
ment, we assume that each panelist acts independently in deciding whether to
audit, and that the signal V is a common value across panelists. Thus, once
one judge audits, no new information is provided by additional observations of
V . If any judge(s) purchase V; we suppose for now that the additional signal
21Wee assume  to be exogenous. It can be endogenized in a more complex model. E.g.,
Cameron and Kornhauser (2006).
22A three-judge panel, therefore, would correspond to M = 2; the U.S. Supreme Court
would correspond to M = 5:
23All our results carry over easily to the case where the realized value of c is stochastic,
drawn from a distribution function G (c) dened on c 2 (0;1):
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is revealed immediately to other members of the panel.24 The panel thereupon
makes a decision by majority vote. Should the panel overturn As decision, we
suppose that A su¤ers a reputational cost equal to "  0: To characterize a
solution for this game, we require that all players policy votes and auditing
decisions are consistent with Bayesian perfection.
3.1.2 Motivating Js Extra Signal
Before proceeding, we pause briey to motivate our assumption about an ad-
ditional signal available to members of J through auditing. What does it
mean, in institutional terms, for an appellate court panelist to spend signi-
cant resources to take another draw on the facts? The simplest interpretation
would mean a closer examination of the materials in the docket. Although those
materials are usually the same ones that the agency / trial judge considered,
appellate judges (and their clerks) have distinct backgrounds and abilities, and
they act with the benet of a time lag. Such distinctions may justify view-
ing intensive appellate review as a form of independent resamplingfrom the
underlying facts.
Alternatively, a reviewing judge could spend resources nding precedents and
doctrinal developments that the agency failed to consider, but which would bear
on the ultimate outcome. Similarly, a reviewing judge could spend resources
working out how the agencys decision might yield counterintuitive policy e¤ects,
either on the issue directly in front of the agency, or on closely connected issues.
Under the right circumstances, this type of research might push other judges to
change their votes, and is fully consistent with our model.
Third, the appellate courts subsequent draw may sometimes represent a
review of materials that were simply not considered by Player A. For example,
amicus briefs often contain or refer to studies that were not considered by the
agency/trial court. Agencies in particular often receive studies and written tes-
timony after the closing date for the submission of evidence. Sometimes these
studies were being created, but were not yet complete, at the time the Agency
closed the docket. In other circumstances studies are done in response to the
Agencys concise statement of basis and purpose published in the Federal
Register.25 The reviewing court may have some discretion about whether to
consider the new materials and how much attention to give to them. For exam-
ple, in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission,26
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed (and unanimously remanded) the
FPCs decision to grant permission to Consolidated Edison to build a pumped
storage hydroelectric power plant on the Hudson River. A plausible reading of
the opinion is that the court was persuaded (in part) by the petitionersintro-
duction of studies which were not reviewed by the FPC about the feasibility
24 In Section 5, we address how relaxing many of the above assumptions would a¤ect our
results.
25Administrative Procedure Act § 553.
26354 F.2d 608 (2nd Cir. 1965), dismissed, 453 F.2d 463 (2nd Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407
U.S. 926 (1972).
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of more environmentally friendly alternatives. Viewed through the lens of our
framework, a decision to take another draw could reect a decision to consider
materials submitted after the agencys / trial courts docket closed.
3.2 Appellate Review Stage
The rst task for characterizing the equilibrium of this game is to analyze the
incentives of the members of a representative judicial panel that is hearing an
appeal, assuming that A has already rendered a decision. Ultimately, the mem-
bers of that panel must decide rst whether to collect additional information
(audit), and second how to vote. To make predictions about their optimal
strategies, we must rst compare the expected payo¤s of informed and unin-
formed judges, respectively.
3.2.1 Uninformed Preferences and Decisions
Let us begin with a representative uninformed judge with ideology i, who
observes Player As signal, z; but has no additional information. Dene such an
actors preferred outcome here to be yUi : It is straightforward to conrm that
yUi = 1 (i.e., panelist i favors the conservative outcome) if and only if:
27
z  zUi   
i ( + ) + 

(1)
It clear by inspection that zUi is strictly decreasing in i, and thus for any two
decision makers j and k with j < k; zUj > z
U
k : Intuitively, the more liberal the
panelist, the harder sellshe is on the conservative outcome. That is, liberal
panelists require a higher public signal z than do relatively conservative players
in order to support the conservative policy choice. By the same reasoning,
conservative actors are a harder sell on the liberal outcome. Should the judicial
panel hear the case, of course, its collective decision will track the median voters
preferences. Consequently, the uninformed panels decision will correspond
to the median voters preferred outcome, yUM ; so that the majority favors the
conservative over the liberal outcome if and only if z  zUM    (
(M)(+)+)
 :
After some algebraic manipulation, one can show that a panelist with ideol-
ogy i sitting on an uninformed panel will realize an expected payo¤ of:
U
 
ijz; (M)

=  Exjz
n 
(x+ i)  yUM
2 jzo (2)
=  
 
1
 + 
+

+ z
 + 
+ (i + 1)
2!
+
(
0 if z  zUM
4

i +
+z
+

else
27The expression emerges from the observation that (XjZ) is normally distributed with
mean +z
+
; and precision  + : A number of the other derivations below also depend on
manipulated Gaussian distributions. See the appendix for details.
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The intuition behind this payo¤structure is perhaps best understood through
a numerical example. Consider Figure 2 below, for the parametric case where
 = 0;  = 0:5; and  =  = 1: The gure envisions a three-judge panel consist-
ing of a liberal
 
(1) =  1

a centrist
 
(2) = 0

and a conservative
 
(3) = 1

;
and depicts for each judge the expected payo¤s associated with both the liberal
and the conservative policy choices (the black and gray curves, respectively).
In addition, each curve distinguishes between equilibrium payo¤s (solid lines)
and out-of-equilibrium payo¤s (dashed lines). In Figure 2B, corresponding to
the centrist panelist, note that the judges equilibrium payo¤ corresponds to the
outer hull of these curves, reecting the power of the median voter to dictate
outcomes. So long as the panel remains uninformed, its decision will track the
median judges preferences as illustrated in Figure 2B. Note also that a local
minimum of the median judges expected payo¤ occurs at zUM = 0; where she
is indi¤erent (or perhaps more accurately, ambivalent) between the conserv-
ative and liberal policies. In Figure 2A, the liberal panelists predispositions
imply that it takes a relatively strong factual case (z > 1:5) to sway her to fa-
vor the conservative policy. Consequently, her equilibrium payo¤ experiences
a downward discontinuity at z = 0; corresponding to the fact that at this point
the median panelist would swing over to the the conservative policy outcome
(prematurely, from the liberal judges perspective). Figure 2C illustrates the
opposite case a conservative panelist whose ideology is i = 1: For this judge
the indi¤erence point between outcomes occurs at zU 1 =  1:5; reecting the fact
that it takes an analogously strong case (z <  1:5) to sway the conservative ac-
tor to favor the liberal policy. Similar to the liberal panelist, the conservative
judges payo¤ also realizes a discontinuity (this one upward) at z = 0; reecting
the point where the median voter begins to favor the conservative policy.
-1 0 1 2 3 4
-10
-5
z
Fig. 2A: ((1) =  1)
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
-10
-5
z
Figure 2B: ((2) = 0)
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1
-10
-5
z
Figure 2C: ((3) = 1)
Figure 2. Uninformed Expected Payo¤s of Mixed Judicial Panelists
As will become evident below, the location of the median judges indi¤erence
point and the corresponding payo¤ discontinuities for the non-median judges
relate directly to auditing incentives within the panel.
3.2.2 Informed Preferences and Decisions
Now consider the case where at least one panelist audits, so that the representa-
tive judge i with ideology i observes both z and v: Dene an informed actors
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preferred policy choice to be yIi : It is straightforward to conrm that y
I
i = 1
(i.e., panelist i favors the conservative outcome) if and only if:
v  vIi   

i  (+  + ) + z + 


In other words, an informed judge favors the conservative option over the lib-
eral one whenever the auditing signal, v; is su¢ ciently strong relative to her
ideology, her priors about x; and the content of As original signal, z: Simi-
lar to the uninformed panel, an informed panel will issue a holding coincid-
ing with the informed median judges preferred outcome, or yIM : Therefore, an
informed panel opts for the conservative outcome if and only if v  vIM 
 

(M)(++)+z+


.
Consequently, a panelist with ideology i sitting on an informed panel real-
izes an expected payo¤ of:
I
 
ijz; (M)

=  Evjz
n
Exjz;v
 
x+ i   yIM
2 jz; vo (3)
=  
 
1
 + 
+

z + 
 + 
+ (i + 1)
2!
+4 

i +

+ z
 + 
0@1  
0@ 

(M) +
z+
+

q

(++)(+)
1A1A
+4 
r

( +  + ) ( + )
 
0@ 

(M) +
z+
+

q

(++)(+)
1A ;
where  (:) and  (:) represent the standard normal probability density and
cumulative distribution functions, respectively.
3.2.3 The Value of Information
Having characterized the expected payo¤s associated with both uninformed pan-
els and informed panels, we are now in a position to consider the di¤erence
 denoted as 
 
ijz; (M)

 between the judges expected payo¤ in the in-
formed state and its counterpart payo¤ in the uninformed state. Implicitly,

 
ijz; (M)

corresponds to the equilibrium value that each judge places on
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additional information (in the form of signal v). Subtracting (2) from (3) yields:

 
ijz; (M)
  I  ijz; (M)  U  ijz; (M) (4)
= 4 
r

( +  + ) ( + )
 
0@ 

(M) +
z+
+

q

(++)(+)
1A
+4

i +
z + 
 + 


8>><>>:

1  

  ((M)+
z+
+ )p

(++)(+)

if z  zUM
 

  ((M)+
z+
+ )p

(++)(+)

if z > zUM
Despite its apparent complexity, this expression generates a number of core
intuitions from this paper. Note that for each judge i; the value of information
hinges on both the judges own ideology (i) and that of the median panelist 
(M)

: This makes sense, since the judges own policy commitments should
factor into whether she nds more information helpful, but so should the prag-
matic assessment of how additional information may a¤ect the ultimate outcome
by swaying the median judge. Harvesting another signal, therefore, may not
only help to rene the auditing judges assessment of her personally preferred
policy, but it may also help her persuade a recalcitrant median judge to join her.
Alternatively, a judge may place little or no value on auditing when the median
judge already is leaning in her direction, since added information may back-
re, persuading the median judge to withdraw her allegiance. Consequently,
strategic, non-median panelists are relatively reluctant to audit when doing so
materially imperils the support of the median voter. These intuitions are stated
formally in the following two lemmas:
Lemma 1: For the median judge with ideology (M), auditing is maximally
valuable at her uninformed indi¤erence point, z = zUM ; and falls symmet-
rically in both directions as z diverges from zUM .
Lemma 2: If judge i is more conservative than the median judge
 
i > (M)

:
 Judge i values information more than the median judge when z  zUM and
less than the median judge when z > zUM :
 The extent to which the more conservative judges valuation exceeds / falls
short of the median judges increases strictly in i:
If judge i is more liberal than the median judge
 
i < (M)

:
 Judge i values information more than the median judge when z  zUM and
less than the median judge when z < zUM :
 The extent to which the more liberal judges valuation exceeds / falls short
of the median judges decreases strictly in i:
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The intuitions behind Lemmas 1 and 2 are perhaps best understood through
a numerical example. Figure 3, below, returns to the same calibration as Figure
2, involving a three judge panel composed of a liberal judge, a centrist median
judge, and a conservative judge, so that ^ = f 1; 0; 1g ; and  = 0;  = 0:5;
 =  = 1: Each diagram represents the value that the liberal, moderate, and
conservative judge attaches  in equilibrium to the additional signal v, as a
function of the agencys initial signal z. The median judge (Figure 2B) always
places positive value on the extra signal, since she dictates the nal outcome,
and such information can only help her rene this choice. In fact, an additional
signal is most valuable when z = 0 the point where the median panelist is
maximally ambivalent between the liberal and conservative policy options. As
z moves away from this point of indi¤erence, her preferred policy choice becomes
more clear cut, and in turn the value she places on additional information decays
(symmetrically, as noted in Lemma 1).
-2 -1 1 2
-1
1
2
z
Figure 3A: (1) =  1
-2 -1 1 2
-1
1
2
z
Figure 3B: (2) = 0
-2 -1 1 2
-1
1
2
z
Figure 3C: (3) = 1
Figure 3. Expected Information Value of Auditing for Mixed Judicial Panelists
In contrast, the liberal and conservative judges (Figures 3A and 3C, respectively)
attach more complicated equilibrium valuations to additional information (as
described in Lemma 2). The liberal judge, for example, values additional
information only when the agencys signal z  zUM = 0:Moreover, in this region,
the liberal judge places a much higher value on learning the new signal than
either of the other panelists. When z < 0; in contrast, the liberal judge may
expect to su¤er disutility from additional information, and in any event places
a much lower value on information than the other panelists. The intuition for
this result is as follows: when z  0, the liberal judge knows that absent more
information, the median panelist will support the conservative policy outcome.
If she is able to convince the median judge to switch sides, the liberal judge can
expect to receive a discontinuous upward shock to her payo¤. But she cannot
win over the median judge without some deliberative ammunition; by auditing,
she may discover information that will bring the median voter on board, and in
the process enhance her payo¤. In contrast, when z < 0; the median panelist
is already leaning towards the liberal policy; additional information, while nice
in the abstract, runs an appreciable risk of pushing the median panelist back
across the political aisle. In the example pictured in Figure 3, this latter threat
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is so signicant that it swamps other plausible values from auditing when z < 0
for the liberal panelist. Exactly the opposite logic follows for the conservative
judge: she places signicant value on auditing when z  zUM = 0; so that the
median judge initially favors towards the liberal outcome. In contrast, the
conservative judge places no value (indeed negative value) on more information
when z > 0:
All told, in this example either the liberal or the conservative judge (but
generally not both) has the greatest incentive on the panel to collect additional
information. As it turns out, this logic carries over more generally to panels of
arbitrary size and ideology, an insight stated formally in the following lemmas:
Lemma 3: When z < zUM the most conservative judge (with ideology (2M 1))
has the maximal incentive of all panelists to audit. When z > zUM , the
most liberal judge (with ideology (1)) has the maximal incentive to au-
dit. If z = zUM ; the most conservative (most liberal) panelist has the
greatest incentive to audit when
 
(2M 1)   (M)

is larger (smaller) than 
(M)   (1)

.
Lemma 4: If c  c(^; z); at least one panelist has an incentive to audit (and
thus learn v), where
c(^; z) = 4
r

( +  + ) ( + )
 
0@  (M) + z++q

(++)(+)
1A (5)
+
8>><>>:
4

(2M 1) +
+z
+



1  

  (M)+
z+
+p

(++)(+)

if z  zUM
 4

(1) +
+z
+

 

  (M)+
z+
+p

(++)(+)

if z > zUM
This condition implicitly denes an auditing interval
h
z(^); z(^)
i
around
zUM :
Note from Lemma 4 that the auditing interval is completely characterized by
the ideologies of the median judge and the two ideologically extreme judges. No
other judges ideology enters into the expression from Lemma 4. In general, as
the ideological wings of the panel grow more extreme, so too does the auditing
interval (and with it grows the prospect of reversal).
A number of corollaries immediately follow from inspection and/or di¤eren-
tiation of the expression in Lemma 4:
Corollary 4.1: The auditing interval
h
z(^); z(^)
i
is strictly increasing in the
precision of the auditing technology () ; and strictly decreasing in the
precision of As signal ( ) and in the realized cost of auditing (c) :
Corollary 4.2: The auditing interval is strictly increasing in (2M 1) and strictly
decreasing in (1).
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Corollary 4.3: The auditing interval is potentially asymmetric.
Corollary 4.4: The auditing interval is invariant to all median- and extrema-
preserving transformations of .
Corollary 4.1 is intuitive. Corollary 4.2 embodies the idea that all else
constant, greater panel diversity (as measured by the ideologies of the most
ideologically extreme panelists) is more likely to induce informed scrutiny of the
agencys decision. This e¤ect emanates directly from the fact that preference
di¤erences between the median voter and the extreme wings of the panel are
what drive the latter to audit when the median would not. Amplifying those
ideological di¤erences (i.e., increasing (2M 1) or decreasing (1)) enhances
this e¤ect. Corollary 4.3, however, suggests that diversity need not inculcate
symmetric scrutiny. In particular, as the conservative (liberal) wing of the
party becomes more distinct from the median, the panel is increasingly likely to
reject liberal (conservative) policies that the median voter would have favored if
uninformed; but it is no more or less likely to reject conservative (liberal) policies
that the uninformed median voter would have favored. Finally, Corollary 4.4
formally restates the result that the auditing interval turns solely on ideologies
of the Left, Right, and Center judges. Consequently, holding those ideologies
constant, our model predicts identical auditing ranges (and reversal rates) for a
3-judge, 5-judge, 9-judge, or even a 99-judge panel.28
3.3 Player As Optimal Strategy
Having characterized the continuation payo¤s of the judicial panel J conditional
on appeal, we now move backwards in sequence to analyze the strategy of Player
A (the agency / trial court), who anticipates the equilibrium strategy described
above: Recall that A is motivated both by a desire to implement her preferred
outcome and to avoid being overturned. Moreover, recall that with probability
(1  ) ; Player As decision will never be appealed, in which case the best
she could do is to implement her sincere policy choice given z. On the other
hand, if As decision is appealed (with probability ), her payo¤ becomes more
complicated. On the one hand, A su¤ers a cost " should her decision be
overturned. But on the other hand, if the reviewing court also augments As
information through judicial review, it will issue a more informed policy choice,
which will also a¤ect and possibly increase As welfare. Combining these
factors, As expected payo¤ given z is:
28We should note that generalizations of our model could weaken this invariance result. For
example, if panelists faced di¤erential costs in auditing, a moderate judge with particularly
low auditing costs may place a higher net benet on auditing than an extreme judge who faces
a high cost of auditing. Similarly, if a relatively moderate judge can collect a signicantly
more precise signal than an extreme judge, the former may determine the extreme end of the
auditing range.
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(1  )  Ex

  (x+ A   yA)2 jz

(6)
+ 
0BB@

1  q^;z

 E^;x

   x+ A   yUM2   0 if yA = yUM" else
 z
q^;z  E^;x;v

   x+ A   yIM2   0 if yA = yIM" else
 z; v
1CCA
where q^;z is an indicator function taking on a value of 1 if, for an ideol-
ogy conguration of ^; the agencys signal z lies within the panels auditing
range.29 Remember that because panelists are not selected until after Player
A has reached a decision, she does not know for sure whether the facts of
the case before her will fall within Js auditing interval, and she must there-
fore form expectations over the probability density of the ordered three-tuple
^ =

(1); (M); (2M 1)
	
; which we denote as f(^):30
Inspection of (6) allows some simplication of its analysis. First, note that
As decision, yA only enters into this expression in two ways: (1) It directly
a¤ects As payo¤ in the event that no appeal is heard, and (2) it a¤ects the
potential costs that A may su¤er if she is overturned by J: Numerous other
terms of this expression, including q^;z;
 
x+ A   yUM

and
 
x+ A   yIM

; are
invariant to As ultimate choice and can e¤ectively be held constant. These
observations, in turn, yield Lemma 5:
Lemma 5: Given the equilibrium behavior of a panel with conguration ^; A
will favor the conservative outcome if and only if:
4 (1  )

+ z
 + 
+ A

 "
0BB@
E(Prfz < z(^)gjz)  E(Prfz > z(^)gjz)
+E Prfz 2 [z(^); z(^)] \ v < vIM
 zg
 E Prfz 2 [z(^); z(^)] \ v  vIM
 zg
1CCA
(7)
To best understand the expression in Lemma 5, it helps to think about the
limiting cases for the probability of appeal () and the cost to being reversed
("). Consider rst how the agency would decide a case if it was indi¤erent to
reversal, so that "  0: This assumption may be plausible in many situations.
One could imagine, for example, that agency appointees are not su¢ ciently long
lived to worry about reversals months or years later; or that public attention
tends to wane over time so that later reversals have little political salience; or
that agencies derive considerable utility from expressing their policy stance (in-
dependent of the policys eventual implementation). In such environments, the
right hand side of (7) e¤ectively disappears, and As choice boils down to select-
ing the conservative outcome if and only if the left hand side of this expression
29 In terms of Lemma 4, q^;z = 1 i¤ z 2
h
z(^); z(^)
i
:
30The functional form of f(^) is provided in the Appendix.
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is nonnegative, which occurs when z  zUA : Not surprisingly, this limiting case
is identical to having the agency implement its sincere policy preference.
Similarly, suppose the cost of being overturned were nontrivial, but that the
probability of appeal were negligible, so that   0: Here once again, the agency
would focus on the left hand side of the expression above, and it would generate
a sincere policy decision.
In contrast, suppose that both the costs of reversal were nontrivial and that
the probability of appeal were close to unity. Here, the agency knows that
its initial policy choice is almost certainly going to be revisited, and thus the
left hand side of the above expression carries little signicance. Player A will
therefore focus on the right hand side of (7), favoring a conservative policy if:
Prfz < z(^)jzg+ E Prfz 2 [z(^); z(^)] \ v < vIM
 zg| {z }
E(PrfJ reverses a conservative decision jzg)
(8)
 Prfz  z(^)jzg+ E Prfz 2 [z(^); z(^)] \ v  vIM
 zg| {z }
E(PrfJ reverses a liberal decision jzg)
Although this expression looks complicated, its interpretation is simple Player
As strategy devolves into minimizing the expected probability of reversal. Ef-
fectively, the agency attempts to mimic the most likely decision of the future
reviewing panel.
Finally, consider intermediate cases, where " and  are large enough to
matter but not so large as to dominate. Here, Player A cares about both its
sincere policy commitments and its aversion to reversal. Consequently, the As
behavior will turn on the relative stakes from each concern. For example, if
it observes a value of z very close its indi¤erence point, zUA ; then Player A will
have only weak preferences over available outcomes. Accordingly, its desire to
avoid reversal will predominate. On the other hand, suppose the distribution of
judicial ideologies from which appellate judicial panels are drawn is highly
dispersed, making it prohibitively di¢ cult to make reliable predictions about
the panels ultimate composition. Here, Player A may rationally throw up its
hands at the prospect of anticipating future decisions, concentrating instead on
issuing a sincere policy decision.
3.4 Equilibrium
Having characterized the continuation payo¤s of both A and all panelists in J ,
we are almost in a position to state the equilibrium for the game. Before doing
so, however, it is necessary to attend to a technical issue relating to equilibrium
selection for the panelists on J . As should be clear from the above discussion,
there may frequently be cases where more than one judge on a panel is willing to
audit. Because auditing provides a common informational good to all, auditing
by more than one panelist is not part of a pure strategy equilibrium, and any
mixed strategy equilibria that support such outcomes are easily dominated by
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numerous coordinated pure strategy equilibria. Thus, it is sensible to assume
that the panelists will nd some mechanism for coordinating their investments.
One such mechanism, which we presume hereafter, is as follows:
Assumption A: (1) If multiple judges on the same panel value additional in-
formation enough to justify auditing, then the judge who places the maxi-
mal value on the additional signal is presumed to bear the cost of auditing.
(2) If two or more judges on the same panel share the maximal value of
an additional signal, they randomize as to who audits.
Although Assumption A seems reasonable (at least to us), there are many
alternatives that would generate outcome-equivalent equilibria.31 Applying this
selection assumption to the Lemmas above, the following result immediately
emerges:
Proposition 1: If Assumption A holds, the following is the unique equilibrium
of the auditing game:
 The agency issues a conservative opinion i¤ the condition in (7) is
satised;
 If an appeal occurs, and if z 2
h
z(^); zUM

; panelist (2M 1) audits
(revealing v), and the panel issues a conservative decision i¤ v  vIM ;
 If an appeal occurs, and if z 2

zUM ; z(^)
i
; panelist (1) audits (re-
vealing v), and the panel issues a conservative decision i¤ v  vIM ;
 If an appeal occurs, and if z = zUM ; the extreme panelist (1) or
(2M 1) that is furthest from (M) audits (revealing v). If both are
equidistant from (M); they randomize as to who audits. The panel
issues a conservative decision i¤ v  vIM :
 If an appeal occurs, and if z =2
h
z(^); z(^)
i
; the panel issues a
conservative policy (overturning Player A if necessary) i¤ z  zUM :
As with Lemma 4, in Proposition 1 the auditing decisions and policy choice
of the panel are fully characterized by the ideologies of the Left, Right and
Center panelists. No other judges ideology enters into the expression from
Proposition 1 (at least with this characterization of the model). Notwithstand-
ing the dominance of the median voter model in positive political theory, then,
the results above suggest ways in which judicial panels (and other deliberative
bodies) respond to their extreme wings rather than the middle. As such, it
joins a growing literature in documenting how non-median members can a¤ect
outcomes, by lobbying, inuencing, shaming, or (in our case) altering the course
of endogenous information production.
31For example, an alternative assumption (that is outcome equivalent) posits that judge i
audits a case with initial signal z if (1) she places a positive net value on auditing, and (2)
the next judge closer to the median judge (if she exists) does not place a positive net value
on auditing.
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4 Examples, Simulations, and Empirical Impli-
cations
This section teases out some of the immediate implications of our model for
the empirical literature on judicial panel e¤ects. As noted in Section 2, this
literature provides signicant support for the moderating e¤ect of ideological
diversity, documenting a tendency of minority and majority judges on mixed
panels to move towards each other when voting. Below we demonstrate how
this (and other) predictions can play out in our model, rst in the form of a
numerical example, and then in a simulation calibrated against real-world data.
Finally, we develop some preliminary thoughts about how our model might be
tested against alternatives in the literature.
4.1 Numerical Example
Consider a numerical example of our model involving a three-judge panel. Sup-
pose that the agency is a Democrat (A =  1), that the cost of reversal (") is
negligible, and as in the Figures above that  = 0:5;  = 0; and  =  = 1:
At these parameter values, it is straightforward to conrm that the equilibrium
probabilities of a liberal and conservative decision by the agency (respectively)
are 80:7% and 19:3%.
4.1.1 Homogenous Democrat Panel
Consider rst a judicial panel composed entirely of Democrat ideologies, so that
(1) = (M) = (3) =  1; which we denote as a DDD panel. The solid line
in Figure 4 illustrates  as a function of prior signal z  the expected value
to each panelist of collecting an additional signal v: Notice that the value of
information is symmetric around a maximum at z = 1:5; which is the point
where the Democrat actors are most ambivalent between the policy outcomes:
This makes intuitive sense, since the point of maximal ambivalence is where
additional information is most useful. In contrast, when z <  0:5 or z > 3:5;
the agencys signal (z) is so strong that the value of additional information
(through v) is negligible.
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Figure 4: Auditing Range of DDD Panel
Suppose that the cost of auditing for each judge is c = 110 (represented by the
horizontal dashed line). As Figure 4 illustrates, each judge places nonnegative
net value on auditing only where the agencys signal z falls in the auditing inter-
val [0:5155; 2:4845] (approximately): Inside this interval, one judge is randomly
selected to audit, and the panel bases its decision on (z; v) : Outside it, no one
audits and the panel bases its decision solely on z: Note that this interval re-
mains symmetric around z = 1:5. The resulting equilibrium has the following
characteristics:
 The Democrat agency A issues the conservative policy whenever z  1:5.
Otherwise it issues the liberal policy.
 The DDD panel audits As decision whenever z 2 [0:5155; 2:4845] : Other-
wise it rubber stamps As decision.
 If the DDD panel audits, it favors the conservative outcome (overturning
A if necessary) whenever v+z  52 : Otherwise it favors the liberal outcome
(overturning A if necessary).
 Viewed ex ante, the DDD court (unanimously) overturns liberal policy
positions by the D-agency at a rate of approximately 6:2%. It (unani-
mously) overturns a conservative policy decision by the agency at a rate
of 18:1%: The unconditional rate of reversal of the agency by the DDD
panel in this case is 8:5%:
4.1.2 Heterogeneous DDR Panel
Now consider what happens if one replaces a Democrat panelist with a Repub-
lican  a DDR panel. Under conventional median voter logic, the injection of
a single R panelist should not a¤ect outcomes, since she is not a pivotal voter,
and thus the panels decision rule (i.e., how they translate either z or (z; v) into
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policy space y) cannot change from the DDD case, at least holding information
constant. However, available information may change with the addition of an
R panelist, who faces di¤erent incentives to become informed of the additional
signal (v). In particular, the lone R may wish to audit cases that the majority
would not so long as his inquiry might plausibly sway their opinion. As pre-
dicted by Proposition 1, the R judge will tend strategically to audit cases lying
solely to the "left" (in z space) of the D majoritys indi¤erence points. These
are the very cases where the Democrat majority is potentially persuadable, yet
may have insu¢ cient incentives to audit acting individually.
The dark solid line in Figure 5 below depicts the maximal valuation that any
of the panelists places on auditing (as a function of z). Note that when z > 1:5;
the diagram is identical to Figure 4. In this region, only the two Democrat
judges place a positive value on auditing. The Republican panelist actively
resists auditing within this range, since the Democrats are already leaning in
his direction, and more information may induce them to reconsider. In contrast,
when z < 1:5; the Republican is strongly motivated to audit, as reected by the
upward shift of the valuation curve (relative to Figure 4) over that interval.
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Figure 5: Auditing Range of DDR Panel
Because of the added motivation of the R whenever z < 1:5; the auditing interval
for the DDR is (approximately) z 2 [ 0:261 5; 2:4845], representing a leftward
expansion from the DDD case (z 2 [0:5155; 2:4845]). The full equilibrium for
the DDR panel is characterized as follows:
 The Democrat agency A issues the conservative policy whenever z  1:5.
Otherwise it issues the liberal policy.
 The DDR panel audits As decision whenever z 2 [ 0:2615; 2:4845] ; which
expands the DDDs auditing interval asymmetrically to the left. Otherwise
it rubber stamps As decision.
 If the DDR panel audits, it favors the conservative outcome (overturning
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A if necessary) whenever v+z  52 : Otherwise it favors the liberal outcome
(overturning A if necessary).
 Viewed ex ante, the DDR panel (unanimously) overturns a liberal holding
by the D-agency at a rate of approximately 7:2% (which exceeds the corre-
sponding 6:2% reversal rate of the DDD panel). The DDR panel overturns
a conservative policy decision by the agency (sometimes unanimously and
sometimes on a party line vote) at a rate of 18:1% (which is identical to
the DDD panel). The unconditional rate of reversal of the agency by the
DDR panel in this case is 9:3% (exceeding the 8:5% unconditional rate for
the DDD panel).
The example above demonstrates many of the core intuitions from Proposi-
tion 1 and Lemmas 1-5. Expected reversal rates increase when one adds even
a single, non-pivotal minority member, with the e¤ect being driven solely by
an enhanced expected frequency with which a unanimous panel reverses liberal
agency pronouncements. To an outsider, this might look like the inclusion of
the R on the panel has made the Ds more collegial, or the R has threatened
to blow the whistle on the Ds. But the e¤ect is distinct: simple self-interest
in a noncooperative setting can drive an outcome where more information in-
duces greater apparent moderation. In other words, the pivotal D voter isnt
becoming nicer; rather, she is using more information, which the R panelist
has (strategically) provided her.
4.2 Calibrated Simulations
In order to illustrate the plausibility of our model in real-world settings, we
calibrated it to the data set developed by Miles and Sunstein (2008). Of
particular interest is their Table 2 (Miles and Sunstein 2008, p. 786), which
reports rates at which individual judges vote to validate an agencys decision,
contingent on the other judges on the panel. The rst column of the table below
lists each possible panel composition; the second lists the type of judge within
the panel; and the third lists Miles and Sunsteins (2008) reported empirical
validation rate.32 The simulations reported in the fourth column estimate a
single agency political ideology (which is slightly liberal), even though the actual
data likely come from several di¤erent agency types (in terms of ideology).33
The results, in our opinion, seem quite good. With a not unreasonable set of
parameters we can come very close to the a¢ rmance rates observed by Miles and
Sunstein; the simulation averaged an error of 1.84% across all six conditions.
32The table reects simulated a¢ rmance rates using parametric values that best t the
actual outcomes under a least squares criterion. Other empirical t criteria generate similar
results.
33Specically, we estimate a pooled agency ideology of A =  0:157 and an auditing cost of
c = 0:7458: We also continue to assume in this simulation (as above) that the costs of reversal
and/or the probability of appeal are modest, so that the agency issues sincere opinions and
the distribution of panel types need not be factored into our analysis. This distributional
information was not available in the Miles/Sunstein data. Including it would increase our
degrees of freedom, so it would only cause our simulated results to improve.
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The parameters used for this simulation reect a true state of the world that is
almost neutral ( =  :0227) in expectation, but has low precision ( = :3677).
In addition, the agencys signal about the true state of the world appears noisy
( = :0837) when compared to the reviewing courts signal ( = 1:3397). We
do not claim that our exercise proves that the parameter values represent the
"true" characteristics of the courts and agencies. Rather, our exercise shows
that if the characteristics embedded within the parameter values used in the
simulation happened to be true, then we would observe a¢ rmance rates very
similar to those observed by Miles and Sunstein.
Panel Panelist M&S (2000) Simulated Abs. Di¤erence
Composition Type Validation Rate Val. Rate Sim. v. Empirical
(D;D;D) D 0:746 0:7539 0:0079
(D;D;R) D 0:697 0:6822 0:0148
(D;D;R) R 0:667 0:6295 0:0375
(D;R;R) D 0:678 0:6933 0:0153
(D;R;R) R 0:604 0:6109 0:0069
(R;R;R) R 0:551 0:5792 0:0282
Table 1: Simulated A¢ rmance Rates
Having satised ourselves that we could replicate their central summary
results, we obtained the actual decision-level data from Miles and Sunstein
(2008).34 Again, the object was to see how well we could simulate their mea-
sured outcomes, but here we hoped to pull apart the Miles and Sunstein data
into more granular categories, and then produce a simulation that came close.
In particular, we went through the data and accounted for whether the admin-
istrative agency was under a Democrat or Republican administration, and then
controlled for panel composition. In addition, for this exercise we simulated
the probability of a panel (i.e. the median voter) voting to overturn the agency.
This exercise produced the following chart:35
34We express sincere thanks to Tom Miles and Cass Sunstein for sharing their data with us.
35For this simulation we minimized the sum of the squares of the values in the last column,
and the minimizing parameter values are  = -0.7841,  = 0.05,  = 0.0029,  = 0.6395, and
c = 4.786. We also t the model using other maximands.
In addition, we experimented with di¤erent lag denitons of when an agency becomes asso-
ciated with the president in charge, given that upon a change in administration, the incumbent
agency may have to continue to defend its actions under the previous administration. Such
adjustments do not appear to a¤ect these results signicantly.
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Agency Panel M&S (2000) Simulated Absolute
Type Composition Reversal Rate Reversal Rate Di¤erence
D (D;D;D) 0 :1325 :1325
D (D;D;R) :4375 :2642 :1733
D (D;R;R) :3913 :4573 :0660
D (R;R;R) :5 :4969 :0031
R (D;D;D) :4 :4445 :0445
R (D;D;R) :3928 :3636 :0292
R (D;R;R) :4528 :3622 :0906
R (R;R;R) :25 :3121 :0621
Table 2. Simulations Using Agency Data
Note that this simulation while still relatively solid  does not "t" as
well as the prior one. There are likely multiple reasons for this. First, there
are two places where the Miles and Sunstein data are non-monotonic. With
a Democrat agency, theory predicts that as we move from a DDR to a DRR
judicial panel, the reversal rate should not fall. Yet, in the Miles and Sunstein
data, the reversal rate from this change in judges falls from .4375 to .3913.
Similarly, with a Republican agency, our theory predicts that when we move
from a DDR to a DRR panel, the reversal rate should not rise. Again, the
Miles and Sunstein granular data contradict this prediction. This e¤ect could
be mere chance (e.g., the number of cases in some of the cells is fairly small);
or relatedly, it might pertain to unobserved characteristics (issue level or judge
level) that neither we nor Miles and Sunstein (2008) account for. In any event,
when we t the parameters in our simulation, our model does not allow the
reversal rate to fall and rise in such non-monotonic ways in the way that it
does in the data. Second, we are trying to t the data on more dimensions in
this simulation than in the prior one, which will tend to produce a looser t.
Third, in these simulations we assign ideology specic scores to the Democrat
agency ( =  1) and the Republican one ( = 1). In Table 1, in contrast, we
instead estimated an agency ideology that we applied across all cases (e¤ectively
giving us more degrees of freedom to calibrate). Nevertheless, even with these
restrictions our model does reasonably well. The only large divergences take
place in the rst two rows of the chart, and perhaps in the R-DRR case. The
other cases t quite well.
At least as an initial matter, we nd these simulations suggestive. They
illustrate that there are parameter values for our model that make it perform,
more or less, like existing empirical studies of judges. If our model had failed
such a test  if we could not nd parameters that made the model resemble
observed empirical patterns then we would regard the model with some skep-
ticism. However, since it passed this initial test at (least from an eyeballing
perspective), it should be a serious candidate for testing in future work. While
we do not concentrate on it here, another artifact of our model may be consis-
tent with other empirical stylized facts in the panel e¤ects literature. Although
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the sole R-panelist in the DDR panel is uncovering information strategically,
for the purposes of swaying his D counterparts, it is possible that his additional
digging will generate a signal that has the opposite e¤ect: That is, it convinces
the R-panelist that the liberal policy outcome is optimal even from his perspec-
tive. This e¤ect is a small one, but under some circumstances the additional
digging undertaken by the minority panel member can also cause him to switch
allegiances.
4.3 Empirical Implications
Although the calibration exercise above illustrates the plausibility of our delib-
erative theory of panel e¤ects, it is not a test of our theory per se. To test it,
we would need to isolate situations where our model theory delivers predictions
that are di¤erent from alternative theories (including certain versions of whistle-
blowing, social collegiality, or attitudinal drift). Constructing such tests must
be done with care (Epstein, et al, 2005; Sisk and Heise 2005; Fischman 2009).
Although we leave for future work the task of designing a suitable set of cases
for just such a comparison, we o¤er some possibilities below.36
There are a number of potential approaches for testing of our model empir-
ically. For example, Landes and Posner (2009) nd strong evidence of mixed-
ideology moderation on three-judge panels, but fail to nd it on the Supreme
Court. Their failure to detect a moderation trend at the US Supreme Court
level may be due to any number of factors. However, our model suggests one
possibility that they measured Court ideology through central tendency mea-
sures (e.g., percent Republican-appointed) rather than variation at the extremes
of the courts ideological spectrum. Our analysis suggests that variation at the
extremes (e.g., changes in the left-most or right-most wings of the court) are
more likely to predict changes in auditing intensity and resulting panel e¤ects.37
We may also gain empirical traction from the fact that our model produces
panel e¤ects in environments that are both information poor and politically
charged. That is, limited information a¤ords judges with the opportunity to
investigate more, and political di¤erences provide them (or at least some of
them) with motivation to do so. Our framework therefore suggests that we
are most likely to observe panel e¤ects in domains where both characteristics
are present (such as in environmental law, securities regulation, or antitrust),
and not in elds that are more purely political (such as abortion or gun control
policy) or technocratic (such as weights and measures policy).
Our account may also shed light on the role of merit in the Supreme Court
conrmation process. Epstein and Segal (2005) measure merit by coding news-
paper editorial evaluations of a nominee. They report that, other things being
equal, merit is positively correlated with senatorial votes for the candidate. Per-
36There is a sense in which our contribution already is empirically driven for our starting
motivation (see Section 2) is to explain stylized empirical facts that a sizeable literature has
already identied.
37Appeals court panels, in contrast, consist of only three judges, and such aggregate mea-
sures do a better job of capturing ideological variation at both the median and the extremes.
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haps surprisingly, this e¤ect is strong enough to overcome all or most sources
of political opposition. Thus, Scalia was conrmed unanimously, and Ginsburg
was conrmed with only three dissenting votes. Our model provides at least
a partial explanation if meritcan be interpreted as judicial accuracy. In our
model, all judges are assumed to be equally precise in harvesting additional
facts; ideologically isolated panelists have an incentive to work hard to provide
better information to the panel. To be sure, the minority judges e¤orts work in
her favor; but perhaps less obvious is the fact that majority judges may also be
better o¤ by the inclusion of the minority judge, due to the public informational
good she provides. This latter e¤ect is accentuated further when the minority
judges sampling precision increases. In this sense, meritorious ideological out-
liers can be good for everyone a possibility that even a callous politician can
love (or at least learn to live with).
Finally, our framework may provide an alternative approach for estimating
ideological scores for judges and other legal actors (e.g., Martin and Quinn
2002; Epstein et al. 2007b). In much of the existing ideological scoring literature,
identication is achieved through an attitudinal model of voting that assumes
complete information and excludes deliberation. One can estimate ideological
scores under our framework too, but identication is based on a deliberative
model of voting with incomplete information and endogenous search. Once
estimated, the predictive power of these alternative scores could be compared
to their attitudinal analogs (e.g., Martin-Quinn scores) as a means for testing
the deliberative against the attitudinal model.38
5 Extensions
The analytical framework presented above also lends itself to a number of theo-
retical generalizations and extensions. Although we do not analyze all of them
here, we briey address some of the more promising ones, noting their likely
e¤ects on our models predictions.
A rst extension of the model involves altering the informational environ-
ment at the review stage. For instance, one could imagine a structure (following
on Spitzer and Talley (2000) and Cameron et al. (2000)), where the appellate
panel cannot directly observe the factual input (z) that undergirds As policy
choice, but instead makes equilibrium inferences from As decision (yA). The
appropriateness of such an assumption would depend on context, requiring a
close appraisal of the circumstances in administrative law and regulation where
an agencys information is reliably encapsulated in its record. Although we do
not work through details of this extension here, our core arguments are likely
to carry over (with some caveats) to the case where As signal is unobservable.
In fact, if the median panelist and the agency share similar ideologies, our re-
38Such a comparison may also bear on the issue of whether judicial ideologies exhibit drift
over time (say, on the Supreme Court). Our model suggests that episodes of apparent drift
could actually be due to changing information production patterns that coincide with changing
ideological compositions of the Court.
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sults tend to become even more pronounced. For example, suppose a Democrat
agency is reviewed by either a DDD or DDR panel. The agencys decision
signals to the majority panelists that a politically-aligned actor observed a sig-
nal that they would likewise nd persuasive, even if they cannot discern how
strong that signal was. Unable to conduct a targeted audit of only those cases
that are true close calls,the Democratsrational response might simply be to
rubber stamp all of the agencys decisions. A Republican minority panelist, in
contrast, is more likely to retain an incentive to audit, but (just as above) she
will do so only for As liberal pronouncements. Consequently, if As informa-
tion were not observable, there can be equilibria where majority panelists never
audit, and minority panelists (if any) categorically engage in one-sided auditing,
reproducing (and even accentuating) the panel e¤ects predicted in our baseline
model.39
Alternatively, one could perturb the informational environment at the de-
liberation stage, permitting auditing panelists to misrepresent (or selectively
disclose) information to their colleagues. A panelist might, for example, mis-
represent the extensive margin of her auditing e¤orts, covering up (perhaps at
a cost) whether she has taken a hard look. Or, an auditing panelist might
misrepresent the intensive margin of her e¤orts, falsifying or distorting (again,
perhaps at some cost) the content of the signal she observed. It is relatively sim-
ple to extend our model to allow for misrepresentation on the extensive margin.
So long as a judges ideological leaning is known (or accurately conjectured)
by other panelists, it will be common knowledge whether she has an incentive
to audit. The silence of a judge known to possess such an incentive creates
an (accurate) inference by others that she discovered information inconsistent
with her preferred position. In a manner akin to the unraveling phenomenon
in information games (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts 1986), the equilibria identied
above would substantially persist.
Misrepresentation on the intensive margin introduces a more complicated
signaling game to our baseline model. We conjecture, however, that such an
extension could entail similar e¤ects. Here, non-auditing panelists, wary of fal-
sication, would rationally interpret the content of the auditing judges signal
in light of her ideology. When a fully separating equilibrium obtains, panelists
can accurately decode the auditors signal, producing essentially the same equi-
libria described above. Under a complete pooling equilibrium, in contrast, the
auditing judge sends uninformative signals, and other panelists simply ignore
her. Anticipating this reaction, of course, the auditing judge would never collect
the signal to begin with. This outcome would be identical to the baseline model
where the cost of auditing (c) is prohibitive, and accordingly our model would
not predict any panel e¤ects. There may also be partially revealing equilibria,
where some judges are willing to bear the cost of falsication, while others (those
with less at stake) are not. In such equilibria, non-auditing panelists would se-
lectively discount the auditors signal. We conjecture that in such equilibria,
39Of course, the categorical nature of auditing in this case also implies that there can be
contexts when both Democrats and Republicans audit, or when neither does. All told, our
panel e¤ects prediction would persist in the aggregate.
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the severity of the panels discount increases as the auditing panelists ideology
grows more extreme. Eventually, the marginal returns to diversity would dissi-
pate for extremely ideological judges, who would lack credibility. Nevertheless,
our core results would persist for judges falling inside this credibility threshold.
Yet a third extension of the models information structure would allow each
panelist to draw a statistically independent auditing signal either simultane-
ously with others or in sequence. Were this possible, multiple judges might
choose to audit As decision, each in an e¤ort to sway the median voter. We
have explored with this extension in a sequential setting, and it tends to produce
a nested version of our baseline model, where extreme panelists engage in an
iterative tug-of-war for the median voters favor. For example, suppose the me-
dian panelist initially leans liberal based on the agencys developed facts. Under
our baseline model, the most conservative panelist has the strongest incentive to
audit. If he does, he may uncover information that pulls the median judge over
to the conservative policy. In response, the most liberal panelist may herself
rationally choose to take another draw, hoping to uncover information that wins
back the median panelist. If she is successful, then yet another conservative
judge may audit, and so forth down the line until the costs of the next draw are
prohibitive. Viewed in this light, independent draws on v would likely amplify
the deliberative dynamics that our baseline model exposes.
We might also extend the policy space beyond two distinct outcomes. For
example, one could introduce a centrist policy option (y = 0) in addition to
the liberal and conservative ones. This extension turns out to be relatively
straightforward within our model, and has the e¤ect of dampening all judges
incentives to audit. For the median judge, a richer set of policy choices a¤ords
her the opportunity to ne tune the outcome to her ideal point and to her
a priori information, which reduces both the costs of error and the value of
additional information. Consequently, with more policy options it can become
more attractive simply to remain uninformed and adopt the centrist position
rather than to invest in additional information. The more ideological judges
will also value additional information less, but they will still have incentives that
are qualitatively similar to those in our benchmark model.40
Another obvious  but possibly di¢ cult  extension is to endogenize the
Agencys decision to do research. In our baseline model, the agency simply
observes z; there is no strategic choice involved. A literature going back at
least to Gilligan and Krehbiel (1997),41 however, investigates the incentives of
an administrative agency (or legislative committee) to gather information and
expertise as a consequence of delegated authority. This literature has been ex-
tended to consider judicial oversight (Stephenson, 2007, 2008) and its e¤ects
on an Agencys decision to gather expertise. A sophisticated court will tend
to consider the feedback e¤ects of its decision rule on the Agencys decision,
and will incorporate these e¤ects into its rule of review. We could follow this
40The principal di¤erence is that with multiple policy choices, there may now be multi-
ple disjoint auditing interval ranges around each of the median judges point of indi¤erence
between two ordered outcomes.
41See also Bueno de Mesquita and Stephenson (2007).
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path with our model, by (say) permitting the agency to make a strategic invest-
ment in the precision of its initial signal, while anticipating how judicial review
subsequently plays out.
Finally, we might attempt to embed our model within a multiple level au-
diting game. (See generally George (1999); George and Solomine (2001)). If we
were to include the full circuit (for en banc review) and the Supreme Court, we
would have four levels. Work is starting to be done with three levels, focusing
on the full circuits decision to review.42 Indeed, Clark (2009) provides an elab-
orate empirical test of granting en banc review within a three-level principal
agent framework, but does not provide a formal model. The equilibria of these
models can be complex a fact that may explain why some recent work (e.g.,
Landes and Posner 2009) fail to nd panel e¤ects at the Supreme Court level
even though nding evidence at the circuit court level. Because our model
provides a general framework for analyzing endogenous information production
in arbitrarily sized panels, however, it may lend itself to such an extension.
6 Policy Implications
In our framework, mixed panels produce more information, which  through
deliberation brings about more informed decisions. While this seems intu-
itively desirable, it need not always follow that more informed decisions are
always optimal, for at least two reasons: First, information in this model is
purchased at a cost; even if majority panelists are eventually persuaded with
new information, it does not imply that the added information was worth its
cost from social perspective. Second, the additional information is generated
instrumentally and is therefore likely skewed towards the interests of parties and
political elites. If those interests do not coincide with the general interests of
the citizenry, the additional information may not represent a real public good.
These concerns aside, however, our analysis may lend at least some theoretical
support to suggestions that we encourage (or even require) mixed panels within
the federal judiciary (Schanzenbach and Tiller 2008).
Our framework does not directly allow us to make strong claims about legal
doctrine, because doctrine is not a necessary ingredient of our model. However,
it is a possible ingredient: as noted above: one plausible interpretation of our
model is that the extra signal harvested by auditing panelists consists of undis-
covered precedents, statutes, regulations or other persuasive authority over the
issue. Under this interpretation, our model may suggest that mixed panels do a
better job of uncovering and adhering to doctrine than do homogenous panels.43
Our model may also have implications for the burgeoning theoretical and
empirical literature on Supreme Court appointments. In this literature, the
Senate and President observe the departure of a member of the Supreme Court,
and then bargain in some structural setting over the new appointee (e.g., Kre-
42E.g., Kastellic (2010). Revesz (1997) at pg. 1747, investigates a hierarchical constraint
hypothesis that stems from the possibility of Supreme Court review.
43On the other hand, our model can say little about writing opinions (majority or dissent).
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hbiel 2007). Both the Senate and the President evaluate new appointees by
referring to their expected votes. In turn, these expectations are conventionally
thought to be the function of each potential nominees individual characteris-
tics. Our model (and the empirical literature that attracted us to it), however,
suggests that the voting proclivities of a new appointee may be signicantly
more complex than this and turn on who is empaneled with him/her. More-
over, the new appointee may also perturb the voting proclivities of incumbent
members of the court. Embedding this feature into the appointment literature
is an interesting (and in our mind worthwhile) challenge.
From a topical perspective, there may also be a number of applications of our
approach. For example, many of the information production / deliberation in-
tuitions analyzed above carry over to other multimember political decision mak-
ers, such as administrative committees or agencies themselves. Our approach
may also dovetail with and contribute to the literature about the endogenous
formation of peer groups through homophily (i.e., connection and information
sharing among philosophically-allied individuals44). Within organizational the-
ory, our analysis may shed light on the extent to which heterogeneity of world
views among block shareholders or corporate board members may better inform
corporate decisions.45 Similarly, our approach may shed light on the conditions
under which having single versus numerous large block shareholders in the own-
ership structure of a company can facilitate e¢ cient endogenous information
production a question that has become increasingly important of late.46
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a simple information-based model of panel de-
liberation at the circuit court level. Proposition 1 (and associated corollaries)
captures central insights from the panel e¤ects literature. Specically, we have
illustrated how mixed panels may induce equilibria manifesting the markers of
moderation among majority (and even minority) panelists. The type of moder-
ation we predict is not an artifact of endogenous preferences, collegiality, group
cohesion or whistleblowing per se, but rather the product of endogenous pat-
terns of information production, developed and provided by panelists who have
diverse ideological commitments. In at least some respects, our argument is
consistent with the claim that mixed panels produce not only di¤erent results,
but also better results than their homogenous counterparts. Our information-
based account joins a group of theories attempting to explain the phenomena of
both majority and minority judges as a function of panel composition, and fu-
44See, e.g., Currarini et al. (2009).
45For example, the now well-documented disagreements between Patricia Dunn (a
governance-oriented director) and Tom Perkins and Jay Keyworth (two strategy-oriented
directors) on the Hewlett Packard Board may have some benets even while it potentially
foments internal conict. See, e.g., Anders & Murray (2006).
46See, e.g., Yucaipa American Alliance Fund LLC v. Reggio et al, C.A. No. 5465-VCS,
(Del. Ch. 2010) (challenging a poison pill that grandfathered in a pre-existing 37-percent
shareholder while being triggered by all others who surpassed 15 percent).
33
ture empirical tests must sort out which theory has greatest explanatory power
in practice. We have suggested a few promising routes for such tests, but we
leave their execution for another day.
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9 Appendix
This appendix includes some basic identities and mathematical derivations that
enter into the analysis, as well as proof of core propositions.
9.1 Distributional Identities
Analyzing the model in the text requires some manipulation of certain probabil-
ity distributions. For the readers reference, some of the key identities are stated
here. Recall from the model that the truestate of the world, X; is distrib-
uted N
 
; 1

; Player As signal Z is distributed such that (ZjX) ~N

x; 1

;
and Player Js signal V is distributed such that (V jX) ~ N

x; 1

: Because
each of X;Z; and V is distributed normally, their various conditional random
variables remain normal as well (see DeGroot 2004). Specically, Table A1
reports the mean and precision (the inverse of the variance) for ve conditional
random variables of interest:
Cond. RV Distributon Mean Precision
XjZ; V Normal +z+v++  +  + 
XjZ Normal +z+  + 
XjV Normal +v+  + 
V jZ Normal +z+ (+)++
ZjV Normal +v+ (+)++
Table A1. Conditional Distributions
In addition, our model makes use of the (so-called) Tail Conditional Ex-
pection. Specically, if X~N

; 1

; then the expectation of X conditional on
X  x^ is given by:
E (XjX  x^) = + 1p


 

 
(x^  )p
1    (x^  )p
!
(A1)
where  (:) and  (:) represent the standard normal probability density and
cumulative distribution functions, respectively (Landsman and Valdez 2005).
Finally, our model requires identifying various order statistics on the set of
panelist ideologies, : Consider a vector of realizations   f1; 2; :::; 2M 1g ;
drawn independently from an identical distribution H () with associated den-
sity h () :Without loss of generality, we can reorder in terms of order statistics
(1); :::; (M); :::; (2M 1)
	
:Dene ^   as the 3-tuple (1); (M); (2M 1)	 ; representing
the minimal, median, and maximal elements of . The k-th order statistic; or
(k); has a probability density function given by:
h(k)
 
(k)

=
(2M   1)!
(k   1)! (2M   1  k)!
 
H
 
(k)
k 1  
1 H  (k)(2M 1 k) h (x)
(A2)
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Applying this expression iteratively, the joint pdf of ^; in terms of H () and
h () ; is as follows:
f(^) =
(2M   1)!
(M   2)!2  h
 
(1)
  h  (M)  h  (2M 1) (A3)
  H  (M) H  (1)(M 2)  H  (2M 1) H  (M)(M 2)
9.2 Derivation of Expected Payo¤ for Uninformed Judge
Consider a judge with ideology i sitting on an uninformed panel with ideological
prole . Judge is expected payo¤ if informed (conditional on z) is given by:
U
 
jz; (M)

=  Exjz
n
((x+ i)  y)2 jz
o
(A4)
=
8<:  Exjz
n
(x+ i + 1)
2 jz
o
if z  zUM
 Exjz
n
(x+ i   1)2 jz
o
else
=  Exjz

x2 + 2x (i + 1) + (i + 1)
2

+ 4

0 if z  zUM
Exjz f(i + x) jzg else
=
 
1
 + 
+

+ z
 + 
+ (i + 1)
2!
+
(
0 if z  zUM
4

i +
+z
+

else
;
which is the expression given in the text.
9.3 Derivation of Expected Payo¤ for Informed Judge
Assuming the panel becomes informed of v; it will issue a decision yIM ; consistent
with the median judges ideology (M): Expected payo¤of any judge on the panel
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with ideology i is thus:
I
 
ijz; (M)

=  Evjz
n
Exjz;v
 
x+ i   yIM
2 jz; vo (A5)
= Evjz
248<:  Exjv;z
n
(x+ i + 1)
2 jz; v
o
if v  vIM
 Exjv;z
n
(x+ i   1)2 jz; v
o
if v > vIM
 z; v
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=  
 
1
 + 
+

z + 
 + 
+ (i + 1)
2!
+ Evjz
(
0 if v  vIM
4

+z+v
++ + i

if v > vIM
=  
 
1
 + 
+

z + 
 + 
+ (i + 1)
2!
+4 

i +

+ z
 + 
0@1  
0@  (M) + z++q

(++)(+)
1A1A
+4 
r

( +  + ) ( + )
 
0@  (M) + z++q

(++)(+)
1A
9.4 Proofs of Lemmas 1-5
Lemma 1: For the median judge, 
 
(M)jz; (M)

is maximal at z = zUM ; and
falls symmetrically in both directions as z moves away from zUM . Con-
sequently, when panel ideologies are homogenous, the auditing range also
will constitute a symmetric interval around zUM :
Proof: First, note that

i +
z+
+

z=zUM
= 0: Therefore, 
 
(M)jz; (M)

z=zUM
simplies to:

 
(M)jz; (M)

= 4 
r

( +  + ) ( + )
  (0) (A6)
= 4   (0) 
r

( +  + ) ( + )
=
s
8




( +  + ) ( + )

Note further that the standard normal density  (x) is maximized at x = 0; and
thus the rst additive term of (4) is maximized when z = zUM : As to the second
term of (4), it is easily veried that its value is negative for all values of z 6= zUM :
Thus, since both additive terms of (4) are maximized at zUM ; so must their sum.
The symmetry of 
 
(M)jz; (M)

around z = zUM follows immediately from the
symmetry of the standard normal distribution around 0. QED
Lemma 2: If judge i is more conservative than the median judge, so that i >
(M) :
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 Judge i values information more than the median judge when z  zUM and
less than the median judge when z > zUM :
 The extent to which the more conservative judges valuation exceeds / falls
short of the median judges increases strictly in i:
If judge i more liberal than the median judge, so that i < (M) :
 Judge i values information more than the median judge when z  zUM and
less than the median judge when z < zUM :
 The extent to which the more liberal judges valuation exceeds / falls short
of the median judges decreases strictly in i:
Proof: An equivalent way to express the value of information for the non-
median judge is to consider the degree to which judge is valuation of auditing
exceeds that of the median judge. Denoting this valuation gap as 
 
i; (M); z

;
the following expression emerges:

 
i; (M); z

= 
 
ijz; (M)
   (M)jz; (M) (A7)
= 4   i   (M) 
8>><>>:
1  

  ((M)+
z+
+ )p

(++)(+)

if z  zUM
 

  ((M)+
z+
+ )p

(++)(+)

if z > zUM
The statements in the Lemma come directly from inspection and/or di¤erenti-
ation of 
 
i; (M); z

: QED
Lemma 3: When z < zUM the most conservative judge (with ideology (2M 1))
has the maximal incentive of all panelists to audit. Similarly, when z >
zUM , the most liberal judge (with ideology (1)) has the maximal incentive
to audit. If z = zUM ; the most conservative (most liberal) panelist has the
greatest incentive to audit when
 
(2M 1)   (M)

is larger (smaller) than 
(M)   (1)

.
Proof: Direct implication of Lemma 2.
Lemma 4: If c  c(^; z); the panel will audit (and thus learn v) where
c(^; z) = 4
r

( +  + ) ( + )
 
0@  (M) + z++q

(++)(+)
1A (A8)
+
8>><>>:
4

(2M 1) +
+z
+



1  

  (M)+
z+
+p

(++)(+)

if z  zUM
 4

(1) +
+z
+

 

  (M)+
z+
+p

(++)(+)

if z > zUM
This criterion implicitly denes strictly positive (but possibly asymmetric)
auditing interval
h
z(^); z(^)
i
around zUM :
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Proof: Direct implication of Lemmas 2-3.
Lemma 5: Given the equilibrium behavior of a panel with conguration ^; A
will make the conservative decision if and only if:
4 (1  )

+ z
 + 
+ A

 "
0BBB@
E

Pr
n
z < z(^)
o
jz

  E

Pr
n
z > z(^)
o
jz

+E Pr
n
z 2
h
z(^); z(^)
i
\ v < vIM
 zo
 E Pr
n
z 2
h
z(^); z(^)
i
\ v  vIM
 zo
1CCCA
Proof: Conditional on knowing z; if A issues the conservative decision
(yA = 1), her expected payo¤ will be:
  (1  )  E

(x+ A   1)2 jz

(A9)
 " 
0BB@ ZZZ
^jz<z(^)
f(^)d^ +
ZZZ
^jz2[z(^);z(^)]
 (  ( ( + ) + z + )) f(^)d^
1CCA
where f(^) is as derived above. If A issues the liberal decision (yA =  1) ; in
contrast, her expected payo¤ will be:
  (1  )  E

(x+ A + 1)
2 jz

(A10)
 " 
0BB@ ZZZ
^jz>z(^)
f(^)d^ +
ZZZ
^jz2[z(^);z(^)]
(1   (  ( ( + ) + z + ))) f(^)d^
1CCA
Consequently, A will make the conservative decision if and only if the di¤erence
between these two expressions is positive, or:
4 (1  )

+ z
 + 
+ A

+"
0BBBBB@
ZZZ
^jz>z(^)
f(^)d^ 
ZZZ
^jz<z(^)
f(^)d^
+
ZZZ
^jz2[z(^);z(^)]
(1  2 (  ( ( + ) + z + ))) f(^)d^
1CCCCCA  0
(A11)
Rearranging and substituting appropriate expectation operators yields the ex-
pression in the text. QED:
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